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Abstract 
Explicit memory declines with age, but age effects on implicit memory are debated. 
This issue is important because if implicit memory is age-invariant, it may support effective 
interventions in individuals experiencing memory decline. This study overcame several 
methodological issues in past research to clarify age effects on implicit memory (priming) and 
their relationship to explicit memory (recognition, source memory). It aimed to (1) recruit a 
large lifespan sample of participants (N=1072) during a residency at the Science Museum, 
London, (2) employ an implicit task that is unaffected by explicit contamination, and (3) 
systematically manipulate depth-of-processing and attention to assess their contribution to age 
effects. Participants witnessed a succession of overlapping colored objects, attending to one 
colour stream and ignoring the other, and at test identified masked objects before judging 
whether they were previously attended, unattended, or new. Age significantly predicted decline 
in both explicit and implicit memory for attended objects. 
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As the proportion of the global population over 65 years of age rises, efforts to clarify 
age-related changes in memory are increasingly urgent. Explicit memory – the conscious 
retrieval of previously studied information – declines with age. However, age effects on 
implicit memory – a change in task performance due to prior exposure to stimuli that does not 
require conscious recollection – remain debated. Discrepancy in the literature means that no 
conclusion surrounding age effects on implicit memory can be drawn. This issue is important 
because if implicit memory is age-invariant, it may support effective interventions in 
individuals experiencing memory decline. For instance, errorless learning, mediated by implicit 
memory, may help older adults learn new face-name pairings (Haslam, Hodder, & Yates, 
2011). 
Reviews have attributed inconsistencies between studies to a range of methodological 
factors (Fleischman, 2007; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003; Ward & Shanks, 2018), but no study has 
leveraged critical recommendations to provide conclusive evidence as to whether implicit 
memory declines or is spared with age. Key issues are summarized next. 
 
Samples, power, and reliability  
A substantial body of research suggests that, despite significant reductions in explicit 
memory, implicit memory remains stable over the lifespan, and is similar in young and older 
adults (reviewed in Ward & Shanks, 2018). However, sample sizes have varied considerably, 
and small but real age differences may have gone undetected due to low statistical power. In 
cross-sectional studies reporting no reliable age difference in priming (a common measure of 
implicit memory), it has usually been numerically lower in older than young adults, and a 
meta-analysis by La Voie and Light (1994) uncovered a significant age effect.  




This issue is exacerbated by inherent differences in task sensitivity to age effects. 
Comparisons are frequently made between recognition and word-stem completion as explicit 
and implicit tasks, but Buchner and Wippich (2000) showed that word-stem completion has 
statistically lower reliability than recognition, and this can explain age-differential patterns (see 
also West, Vadillo, Shanks, & Hulme, 2017). The goal of a recognition task, to discriminate 
between studied and new items, is highly constrained, whereas word-stem completion, which 
involves completing stems (e.g., HO___) with the first word that comes to mind, is less so. 
This flexibility leads to response variability and increased error variance making it difficult to 
detect small effects, and may explain why many prior studies have uncovered significant age 
differences in explicit but not implicit memory. Word-stem and word-fragment completion are 
common implicit tests, yet poor reliability may mask a genuine age-related decline in implicit 
memory. Buchner and Wippich found that a perceptual identification task had greater 
reliability than word-stem completion and equivalent to recognition. Perceptual identification, 
like recognition, has a constrained goal (to quickly identify items), and response variability is 
further reduced by its speeded nature. 
 
Processing and task characteristics  
Depth-of-processing during encoding has varied across studies, with some encouraging 
deep/conceptual processing, and others shallow/perceptual processing  (see Mitchell & Bruss, 
2003). However, older adults are impaired in elaborative/conceptual encoding (e.g., Rybash, 
1996), which may explain greater age effects in studies involving conceptual processing (e.g., 
Ward, Berry, & Shanks, 2013) and smaller/absent age effects in studies involving perceptual 
processing (e.g., Soldan, Hilton, Cooper, & Stern, 2009).  
Moreover, sometimes items are presented in an unattended stream or as irrelevant 
information during encoding (e.g., Gopie, Craik, & Hasher, 2011). However, older individuals 




experience greater difficulty with focussed attention and filtering of irrelevant information 
(Healey, Campbell, & Hasher, 2008), so processing may differ. Depth-of-processing and 
attention are thus key potential moderators of age effects on implicit memory, yet have never 
been systematically manipulated to gain a clear understanding.  
 
Explicit contamination 
Some implicit tasks may be susceptible to contamination by explicit memory strategies. 
This is a significant issue when it comes to aging; reduced priming with age could reflect the 
use of explicit strategies that are more beneficial to young adults. Mitchell (1995) reported that 
age differences in implicit memory disappeared when data were adjusted for explicit 
contamination, and Russo and Parkin (1993) found an age effect that disappeared when explicit 
memory was equated between groups. Importantly, the meta-analysis by La Voie and Light 
(1994), that uncovered a significant age effect on implicit memory, did not account for explicit 
contamination. 
A range of recommendations to circumvent explicit contamination have been put 
forward, largely centred on reducing awareness of the connection between study and test 
(MacLeod, 2008). However, a valuable method for studying the relationship between explicit 
and implicit memory is to measure them concurrently using the continuous identification with 
recognition (CID-R) task (e.g., Stark & McClelland, 2000). On each trial a word/object is 
identified prior to a recognition judgement. Indices of explicit and implicit memory for each 
item are captured within a few hundred milliseconds of one another, making them more 
suitable for comparison than measures sampled in separate experimental phases involving a 
delay.  
In the CID-R paradigm participants are aware that studied items are presented at test, 
and could feasibly attempt to use an explicit strategy. However, there is evidence that priming 




on this task is unaffected by explicit contamination. For instance, Brown, Jones, and Mitchell 
(1996) reported no difference in priming when identification and recognition were measured 
concurrently trial-by-trial relative to separate experimental phases. Brown, Neblett, Jones, and 
Mitchell (1991) (see also Mitchell & Bruss, 2003) found no difference in priming on picture 
and word naming tasks between participants who witnessed studied and new items in separate 
blocks (and were informed which block contained which type of item) versus interspersed. 
Ward et al. (2013) replicated the above finding of no difference in priming when the 
identification task was presented alone versus when concurrent recognition judgements were 
elicited (Experiment 2), and also found that identification task performance was not enhanced 
by informing participants whether the next item to appear was previously studied or new, nor 
was it hindered when such explicit cues were incorrect (Experiments 3a-3b). Thus, explicit 
processing does not appear to affect priming in the CID-R paradigm, and this may be because 
identification is accomplished too quickly for the engagement of effortful explicit strategies 
(MacLeod, 2008).  
 
The current investigation 
This study aimed to overcome the issues above to clarify age effects on implicit 
memory (priming), and their relationship to explicit memory (recognition, source memory). 
The study was highly powered and employed a CID-R task that evidence suggests is unaffected 
by explicit contamination. Depth-of-processing and attention were manipulated to reveal their 
contribution to age effects, and source memory (retrieval of contextual detail associated with 
an item’s presentation) was captured as an additional explicit measure as the relationship 
between priming, recognition, and source memory in aging has never been examined in this 
context.  Evidence for preserved implicit memory with age would be stable priming with age 
(supported by Bayesian analyses providing evidence in favour of the null hypothesis) coupled 




with reliable reductions in explicit memory. To foreshow the central finding, age predicted 
decline in both explicit and implicit memory for attended items. 
 
Method 
The study took place during a residency at the Science Museum, London, in which 
adolescents through to older adults were recruited to map memory changes across the lifespan. 
This is an important departure from studies that habitually compare relatively small samples of 
young (~18-30 years) and older adults (~65+ years). Participants were exposed to overlapping 
line drawings of objects colored in cyan and magenta, attending to one color and ignoring the 
other. They judged whether objects were angular or rounded (shallow processing), or natural or 
manufactured (deep processing), before completing a CID-R task in which they identified a 
masked object on each trial before judging whether it was previously presented in cyan or 
magenta, or was new.  
 
Participants and Design 
Many prior studies have used inappropriately small sample sizes, and small effects may 
have gone undetected due to low statistical power. Added to this, most studies have compared 
the performance of small groups of young and older adults, whereas this study recruited a large 
lifespan sample. Over the course of a 6-week residency at the Science Museum, 1072 visitors 
(448 male) between the ages of 12 and 82 years volunteered to take part. Ethical approval was 
granted by the Middlesex University Research Ethics Committee, and all participants provided 
informed consent, including parent/guardian consent for those aged under 16. Participants were 
required to be fluent in English, have normal or corrected vision, no color blindness, and no 
history of memory problems. There was no upper age limit but it was a requirement that older 
participants were healthy and free of dementia. Twenty-one participants were excluded (9 




adolescents, 2 young, 3 mid-young, 1 middle, 1 mid-older, and 5 who gave no age) due to 
missing information and/or accuracy levels <80% in the identification task (see Procedure). 
The final sample comprised 1051 participants (443 male) aged between 12 and 82 years (M = 
29.36, SD = 14.31).  
Due to the open environment and time restrictions applied by the museum, it was 
necessary to keep background tests to a minimum. Information was collected on age, sex, years 
of education, vision, intellectual functioning (Wechsler Test of Adult Reading [WTAR], 
Wechsler, 2001; participants aged 16 years and over), and processing speed. No formal 
assessment of cognitive impairment (e.g., Mini Mental State Exam) could be performed on 
older participants, but we can be confident that all were free of cognitive impairment as (1) 
they were asked to confirm this eligibility requirement when providing consent, and (2) there 
were no outliers or anomalies in the test data or WTAR scores to suggest abnormal function. 
Sample characteristics are provided in Table 1, segregating participants into six lifespan 
groups: adolescents (12-17 years), young adults (18-24 years), mid-young adults (25-34 years), 
middle adults (35-49 years), mid-older adults (50-64 years), and older adults (65+ years).  
Priming (speed of perceptual identification), recognition and source memory were 
assessed using a CID-R task following a separate study phase in which attention was 
manipulated within-participants (attended, unattended objects), and depth-of-processing was 





























































14.67 (1.89) 21.07 (2.00) 28.83 (2.98) 41.42 (4.19) 55.30 (4.36) 70.60 (4.40) 
N Male / 
Female 
 
72 / 139 122 / 169 123 / 138 78 / 92 32 / 51 16 / 19 
N Deep  / 
Shallow 
 





10.51 (2.31) 15.60 (2.68) 17.45 (3.09) 17.98 (3.87) 17.88 (6.05) 16.26 (5.11) 
WTAR* 
 
38.51 (6.23) 39.91 (7.51) 42.06 (6.79) 43.18 (6.35) 42.46 (7.15) 45.94 (3.64) 
Vision* 
 
37.13 (12.17) 37.36 (13.26) 34.94 (7.04) 40.89 (16.27) 42.25 (11.68) 49.54 (27.89) 
Processing 
speed (ms)* 
2412 (461) 2217 (449) 2225 (453) 2414 (559) 2580 (638) 2870 (640) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. The WTAR (Wechsler Test of Adult Reading, Wechsler, 2001), 
in which participants are asked to pronounce uncommon English words (maximum score 50), is an 
assessment of intellectual functioning. This was administered to participants aged 16 years and over, thus 
the score for Adolescents is based on 97 participants who met this criterion. The mean for mid-older adults 
excludes one participant with a missing score. Visual acuity was measured using the Near Vision Test Card 
(Schneider, 2002), viewed at a distance of 16 inches. Scores can range from 16 (highest acuity) to 160 
(lowest acuity). One adolescent with a score of 14 was not included. Processing speed was indexed as the 
mean of the baseline (new item) identification times in the CID-R task. *Significant main effect of age 
group (p’s < .001). Bonferroni corrected follow-up comparisons indicated significant differences in 
Education (adolescents vs. all other groups; young adults vs. all groups apart from older adults), Vision 
(adolescents vs. mid-older adults and older adults; young adults vs. mid-older and older adults; mid-young 
vs. middle adults, mid-older adults, and older adults); WTAR (adolescents vs. all groups apart from young 
adults; young adults vs. all groups apart from adolescents; mid-young vs. older adults;), and Processing 
speed (adolescents vs. all groups apart from mid-young and middle adults; young adults vs. all groups apart 
from mid-young adults; mid-young vs. all groups apart from young adults; middle adults vs. all groups 
apart from adolescents and mid-older adults; older adults vs. all groups apart from mid-older adults).  





Stimuli comprised a subset of the 260 line drawings of everyday objects created by 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). Highly similar items (e.g., blouse, jacket) were removed, 
leaving 245 objects. Approximately half were naturally occurring items and half were 
manufactured. Objects were 240 x 240 pixels in size and presented in the centre of a white 
background screen. Forty were presented in the study phase, 20 colored in magenta and 20 in 
cyan, with approximately equal brightness and luminance. On each trial, two objects – one 
magenta and one cyan – overlapped, and participants attended to one color stream and ignored 
the other (Figure 1A). Eighty objects were presented at test, 40 from the study phase (20 
attended, 20 unattended), and 40 new items. Objects were presented in black at test. Objects 
were randomly assigned to serve as attended, unattended or new items, and a different random 
assignment was used for each participant.  
The mask used in the identification task (Figure 1B) was 400 x 400 pixels in size, 
created using a script that randomly superimposed lines and arcs of a similar thickness to the 
lines of objects in the stimulus set. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place within the Live Science space at the Science Museum in 
South Kensington, London. There were five desktop PCs with a screen resolution of 1280 x 
1024 pixels. Participants performed the experiment individually, but up to five could take part 
at a time. An adjustable screen surrounding the area gave privacy and ensured that any waiting 
participants could not view the experiment. Guidelines for the residency stated that the 
procedure should not exceed 30 minutes, so the experimental task was designed to take 20-25 
minutes and the remaining 5-10 minutes was spent collecting background information, 




including age, sex, years of education, vision and intellectual functioning (WTAR; Table 1). 
This was done prior to the experimental task and after eligibility check. 
The experiment was programmed using MATLAB 2016b. Viewing distance was 
approximately 50 cm. During the study phase participants witnessed a steam of overlapping 
object pairs. One of the objects was presented in magenta and the other in cyan. Participants 
were told that the objects would be presented briefly and that they should attend to one color 
(either magenta or cyan) and ignore the other. The attended color was randomized between 
participants and collapsed for analysis. Each object pair was presented for 250 ms, followed by 
a black fixation point for 1250 ms. The duration of the interstimulus interval was chosen to 
allow time for a response on each trial. The response depended on the depth-of-processing 
manipulation, which was randomized between participants. In the deep processing condition 
participants decided whether the attended object was natural or manufactured, and in the 
shallow condition whether it was angular or rounded, using the Z and M keys. Participants 
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible based on their first impression. The response 
cue “Z = natural; M = manufactured” or “Z = angular; M = rounded” remained on the screen 
at all times, in a font color to match the attended stream of objects. There were 8 practice trials 
prior to the 40 experimental trials.  
Following the study phase there was a retention interval of approximately 3 minutes 
while participants read instructions for the CID-R task. Each trial consisted of a speeded object 
identification followed by a recognition/source judgment. Forty randomly chosen old objects 
from the study phase (20 attended, 20 unattended) appeared at test, along with 40 new objects, 
presented in black on a white background. Participants were informed that on each trial they 
would first have to identify an object that would be masked and difficult to make out. They 
were informed that the object would appear to gradually emerge and their task was to press the 
enter key as soon as they could identify it. Speed was emphasized, but participants were asked 




to be as accurate as possible. Each trial ran as follows: The mask was presented for 250 ms, 
followed by an object for 17 ms (one screen refresh at 60 Hz), and then the mask again for 233 
ms, forming a 250 ms block. The block presentations continued with the object presentation 
increasing by 17 ms on each alternate cycle and the mask duration decreasing by the same 
amount, with the effect that the object appeared to gradually clarify (Figure 1B). Identification 
time was captured upon pressing the enter key, at which time the object disappeared and 
participants were prompted to type their response (e.g., ‘basket’) into a box. If the enter key 
had not been pressed after 7500 ms (i.e., when the object was fully displayed), the trial was 
discarded and the cue “Please try to be faster on the next trial” appeared for 1000 ms.  
After identifying the object participants judged whether it was shown in the study 
phase, and if so, in what color – the color that they attended to, or the color that they ignored. 
The object was presented once more (in full view) along with the instruction “Was the object 
shown in the very first part of the experiment or is it new?”, “1 = previously purple”, “2 = 
previously blue”, “3 = new”. Participants responded via a number keypress. They were 
informed that half of the objects were presented previously (an equal number of attended and 
unattended objects) and half were new. No time limit was imposed. Following a response, a 
fixation point was presented for 500 ms prior to the next trial. At the end of the experiment 
participants received on-screen feedback with their average response times and recognition 
scores (percent) for attended, unattended, and new objects.  







… until participant 




Was the object shown in the very first 
part of the experiment or is it new?















Figure 1. A. Events in the study phase. Participants were presented with a stream of overlapping 
objects, one colored in cyan and the other in magenta, and attended to one color stream and ignored the 
other (counterbalanced). The text color of the response cue served as a reminder of the color stream to 
attend to (magenta in the example). On each trial participants either judged whether the attended object 
was natural or manufactured (deep processing), or angular or rounded (shallow processing).   B. Events 
in a single trial in the CID-R task. An object (old [attended/unattended] or new) gradually clarified from 
a background mask and participants identified the object as quickly as possible (priming measure), 
before making a recognition/source memory judgment (explicit measures). During the clarification 
procedure the background mask was initially presented for 250 ms prior to a flash of the object for 17 
ms. Presentations of the mask and object were then alternated with the object duration increasing by 17 
ms and the mask duration decreasing by 17 ms each alternate cycle, with the effect that the object 
gradually emerged. A keypress ended the clarification procedure, at which point the object disappeared 
and the participant’s identification RT was captured. The participant then typed the object name into a 
box before the object was presented again for the recognition/source memory judgment. 
 





An alpha level of .05 was used for all tests, and t-tests are two-tailed. Partial eta squared 
(ηp
2
) effect size is reported for significant ANOVA effects, and Cohen’s d for t-tests.   
 
Study phase 
 Trials on which no keypress was made, or with response times <200 ms were excluded. 
One older participant made no keypresses in the study phase and was not included in this 
analysis. Mean classification response times did not significantly differ between the deep (M = 
701 ms, SE = 6) and shallow (M = 700 ms, SE = 7) conditions, t(1048) = 0.02, p = .985, d = 
0.001, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.12]. 
 
Priming 
Trials associated with incorrect identifications and/or RTs <200 ms or >3 SD from the 
mean were excluded (4.90% of trials). Table 2 reports identification rates and RTs for attended, 
unattended, and new items. Priming was calculated by subtracting each participant’s mean old 
item RT (attended/unattended) from their mean new item RT, expressed in proportion to their 
mean baseline (new item) RT: (RT new – RT old) / RT new. A proportional measure is deemed 
most suitable for age comparisons, because slower baseline responding in older than young 
adults can artificially elevate priming when an RT difference score is used (e.g., Faust, Balota, 










Table 2.  
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Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Identification rate refers to the percentage of CID-R trials 
remaining post screening. Trials associated with incorrect identifications and/or response times < 200 ms 
or >3 SD from the mean were excluded. Proportional priming (Prop. Priming) was calculated as (RT new – 
RT old) / RT new. 
 
A 6 (age)  2 (attention)  2 (depth-of-processing) mixed ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of attention on priming, F(1,1039) =172.02, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .142, and a 
significant interaction between attention and age, F(5,1039) = 3.84, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .018. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant (p’s > .05). The attention  age interaction 
suggests a statistical age effect for attended but not unattended items. Priming for attended 




items was statistically above zero in all age groups (p’s < .008, d’s > 1.38 [Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha]), while priming for unattended items was not significant in any group apart from 
adolescents, t(210) = 2.86, p = .005, d = 0.20, 95% CI [0.06, 0.33], so a one-way ANOVA was 
performed on attended items where priming was present. Given no main effect of depth-of-
processing (F(1,1039) = 0.25, p = .616, ηp
2
 < .001), deep and shallow conditions were 
collapsed. This revealed a significant main effect of age, F(5,1045) = 3.59, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .017. 
Confirming these findings, multiple regression with age as a continuous variable revealed a 
significant linear decline in priming for attended items with age, F(1,1049) = 7.82, p = .005, r 
= -.086. No extra variance was explained by adding a quadratic component of age (R
2
 change < 
.001, p = .483). An orthogonal component with a correlation of 0 was used to overcome 
multicollinearity. 
 
Figure 2. Mean proportional priming (top panel) and mean d' scores (lower panel) across age groups 
for attended items, collapsed across depth-of-processing condition. Bars indicate standard error of the 
mean (SE). 
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Recognition and source memory 
On each trial participants judged whether an object was previously presented in blue or 
purple (old judgment) or was not previously presented (new judgment). For recognition 
analyses, ratings 1 (previously purple) and 2 (previously blue) were collapsed to a single ‘old’ 
judgment. For each participant, d' was calculated as z-transformed Hit rate (proportion old 
items judged old) minus the z-transformed False Alarm rate (proportion new items judged old), 
separately for attended and unattended items (Table 3). 
Recognition was significantly above chance (d' > 0) for attended items in all age groups 
(Bonferroni adjusted p’s < .008, d’s > 3.53), but not for unattended items in middle adults 
t(169) = 2.54, p = .012, d = 0.20, 95% CI [0.04, 0.35], or older adults, t(34) = 2.57, p = .015, 
95%, d = 0.43, 95% CI [0.08, 0.78]. A 6 (age)  2 (attention)  2 (depth-of-processing) 
ANOVA revealed significant main effects of attention, F(1,1039) = 1290.60, p < .001, ηp
2
 =
.554, and age, F(5,1039) = 2.33, p = .041, ηp
2
 = .011, and an interaction between the two,
F(5,1039) = 6.98, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .033. There was no effect of depth-of-processing, F(1,1039) =
0.03, p = .873, ηp
2
 < .001, and no other interactions (p’s > .05). Collapsed across depth-of-
processing, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of age for attended items, 
F(5,1045) = 5.52, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .026. There was no main effect of age on unattended items,
F(5,1045) = 0.61, p = .694, ηp
2
 = .003. As with priming, multiple regression revealed that age
as a continuous variable significantly predicted a linear decline in recognition of attended 
items, F(1,1049) = 7.19, p = .007, r = -.083. An additional 1.16% of variance was explained by 
adding the quadratic component of age (R
2
 change = .0116, p < .001).
 The adolescent data were included to shed light on lifespan changes in priming and 
recognition. For readers interested specifically in adult age differences, an analysis excluding 
adolescents revealed a consistent pattern. Collapsed across depth-of-processing there were 
significant main effects of age on recognition (d'), F(4,835) = 5.85, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .027, and
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priming, F(4,835) = 4.65, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .022 (attended items), and age as a continuous
variable predicted significant linear declines in recognition, F(1,838) = 19.28, p < .001, r = -
.15, and priming, F(1,838) = 10.94, p = .001, r = -.11.  
Table 3.  
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Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Hit rate = Mean proportion ‘old’ judgments to old items 
(attended/unattended). Responses 1 and 2 on the scale were collapsed to a single ‘old’ judgment. FA (false 
alarm) rate = Mean proportion ‘old’ judgments to new items. d' = z(Hit rate) - z(FA rate). The Snodgrass 
and Corwin (1988) correction was applied to Hit and FA rates with values of 0 or 1 (i.e., Hit rate = (n Hits 
+ 0.5) / (n old + 1); FA rate = (n FAs + 0.5) / (n new + 1).
Breakdown of attended/unattended (i.e., color) and new judgments, collapsed across 
depth-of-processing, revealed that attended items tended to be correctly judged as attended 
rather than as unattended/new, F(1.67, 1746.75) = 409.18, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .281 (Greenhouse-
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Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom are reported as the assumption of sphericity was violated). 
This ability peaked in young adults before declining (judgment  age interaction: F(8.36, 
1746.75) = 11.33, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .051). There was an increasing tendency to judge items as
new with age, and at the extreme older adults were unable to judge whether attended items 
were attended or new, t(34) = .26, p = .796, d = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.38] (see Figure 3 for 
judgments and accuracy by item type). Both unattended and new items tended to be judged as 
new (F(1.56, 1631.69) = 789.19, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .430, and F(1.46, 1537.93) = 1257.72, p <
.001, ηp
2 
= .546, respectively), and unattended items were not accurately judged as such by any
group.  
Figure 3. Left: Mean proportion of attended, unattended, and new judgments by item type collapsed 
across depth-of-processing condition. Bars indicate SE.  Right: Accuracy of source judgments 
(attended/unattended) to attended and unattended items collapsed across depth-of-processing. Bars 
indicate 95% CI of the mean.  
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Associations between priming and recognition 
Collapsed across depth-of-processing, these analyses examined whether identification 
RTs in the priming task varied according to whether the item was explicitly remembered 
(Table 4). RTs were significantly faster for items judged old compared to ones judged new, 
F(1,1027) = 277.48, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .213, and this was consistent across age groups (no
interaction with age, p = .413; all paired t-tests p < .001).  
Identification RTs were also analysed according to whether the recognition judgment 
was a hit, miss, false alarm, or correct rejection). RTs significantly varied according to 
recognition judgment, F(3.58, 3303.28) = 54.86, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .056, and there was no
interaction with age (p = .862) (all Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted). Collapsed across age, 
identification RTs were fastest overall for attended items that were recognized (attended hits, 
M = 2151, SD = 528), and slowest for correctly rejected new items (M = 2364, SD = 525), and 
this difference was significant, t(1029) = 26.61, p < .001, d = 0.83, 95% CI [0.76. 0.90]. 
Attended hits were associated with significantly faster identification times compared to 
attended misses, t(957) = 13.82, p < .001, d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.38, 0.51], but—revealing no 
evidence of priming for unrecognized objects—RTs for misses did not differ from RTs to 
correct rejections (attended misses: M = 2361, SD = 518; unattended misses: M = 2352, SD = 
548; correct rejections: M = 2364, SD = 525, p = .278 and .157, respectively). These clear 
associations between priming and recognition are consistent with previous findings from the 
CID-R task (Berry et al., 2012). 
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Items judged New 2419 (452) 2240 (445) 2245 (462) 2427 (568) 2595 (649) 2893 (645) 
Items judged Old 2307 (464) 2100 (455) 2095 (439) 2298 (536) 2484 (643) 2745 (618) 
Old items 
   Attended Hits 
   Unattended Hits 
   Attended Misses 
   Unattended Misses 
New items 
   False Alarms 





































Note. Collapsed across depth-of processing condition. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Discussion 
This study aimed to clarify age effects in implicit memory and their relationship with 
explicit memory by overcoming several issues that have compromised past research. The study 
used (1) a large lifespan sample rather than mere comparison of young and older participants, 
(2) an implicit task that evidence suggests is unaffected by explicit contamination, (3) a semi-
naturalistic setting, and (4) directly manipulated depth-of-processing and attention, factors that 
have varied in prior studies, to reveal their contributions to age effects. The data revealed age-
related declines in both implicit and explicit memory. Age effects were present for attended 
items, but not unattended items where performance was no greater than chance in the majority 
of cases. Age predicted a decline in explicit and implicit memory for attended items, with a 
quadratic trend in recognition indicating that it increased up to mid-young adulthood before 
declining. The ability to correctly judge attended items as attended rather than unattended/new 
peaked in young adults before declining, and older adults were unable to judge whether 




attended items were attended or new. There was no priming for items that were not recognized, 
and this was consistent across age groups.  
Findings in relation to explicit memory are consistent with a body of literature. Nilsson 
(2003) reported an increase in explicit memory up to 25–30 years of age before gradual 
decline. A progressive decline has been shown longitudinally (e.g., Davis, Trussell, & Klebe, 
2001; Fleischman, Wilson, Gabrieli, Bienias, & Bennet, 2004; Hultsch, Hertzog, Small, 
McDonald-Miszczak, & Dixon, 1992), and numerous cross-sectional studies show poorer 
performance in older compared to younger adults on recall and recognition tests (see Jelicic, 
Craik, & Moscovitch, 1996; Kausler, 1994).  
In a field replete with contradictory findings surrounding age effects on implicit 
memory, this study provides much-needed clarification by addressing prominent issues to 
uncover evidence of decline that qualitatively mirrors that in explicit memory. Some prior 
studies have reported reductions in implicit memory with age on tests of word-stem completion 
and perceptual identification (e.g., Abbenhuis, Raaijmakers, Raaijmakers, & Van Woerden 
1990; Hultsch, Mason, & Small, 1991; Ward et al., 2013), but the present study controls the 
possibility that the effect is mediated by explicit contamination and/or differences in processing 
or attention.  
Although the qualitative patterns of change in explicit and implicit memory are 
consistent, the decline in implicit memory is smaller than that in explicit memory. This is 
consistent with the meta-analysis by Light and LaVoie (1994), and is likely a function of 
differences in task sensitivity. Implicit tasks are generally associated with greater variability 
than explicit tasks (e.g., Buchner & Wippich, 2000; West et al., 2017), meaning that it is more 
difficult to statistically detect effects in the former. Indeed, a single system computational 
model developed by Berry and colleagues predicts larger effects on recognition than priming 
by assuming that the error variance associated with the priming task is greater than that of 




recognition (e.g., Berry, Shanks, Speekenbrink, & Henson, 2012). Variability of baseline (new 
item) RTs was highest in the oldest group in the present study, and this may have been 
exacerbated by the relatively smaller size of this group.  
The observed age-related decline would benefit from validation in a longitudinal design 
to determine within-individual changes in memory over time. Longitudinal studies are less 
common in the literature, but have largely revealed reductions in explicit memory with age 
coupled with null changes in priming (e.g., Davis et al., 2001; Fleischman et al., 2004). These 
studies are open to the same problems reviewed here and may have failed to statistically detect 
small changes in priming. Although extremely difficult to accomplish on a similar scale to the 
present study, we conjecture that a similar longitudinal study would be likely to expose a 
consistent pattern of decline in explicit and implicit memory.  
 There was no effect of depth-of-processing. This was manipulated in a manner that has 
produced effects on explicit memory in the past, albeit not unfailingly (see Intraub & Nicklos, 
1985). However, most prior studies have used words as stimuli and free recall as the task. 
There is also evidence that semantic processing can occur with extremely brief presentations 
(e.g., Potter, Wyble, Hagmann, & McCourt, 2014), so exposure time in this study may have 
been sufficiently long to enable deep processing in both conditions. Indeed, classification times 
were similar in the deep and shallow conditions, suggesting equivalent processing. The 
observations suggest that differential processing during encoding (i.e., deep versus shallow, as 
may naturally occur in young versus older adults) is an unlikely mediator of age effects in 
implicit memory. Rather, variations in the magnitude of age differences are likely due to a 
combination of issues with power and task reliability.  
 To conclude, this study clarifies the effect of age on implicit memory, delivering robust 
evidence for a decline that qualitatively mirrors that in explicit memory. This has significant 
implications for an aging population, suggesting limits to the utility of implicit memory for 




supporting interventions in individuals experiencing memory decline. The findings also hold 
implications for our theoretical understanding of the organisation of memory, suggesting that 
explicit and implicit memory do not operate independently but are driven by a single 
underlying system (Berry et al., 2012). 
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